-
The Debate of Islam and Modernity in the Turkish Experience (2 - 3)
-
Implications at the Turkish Level
It is essential to seek sources for the distinctive relationship between religion and politics in Turkey, particularly in the context of Turkish Islam, which is conciliatory and influenced by the religions of the Asian continent, as well as in the Balkan world, and through the Ottoman past and Christianity.
Similarly, it is impossible to present the religious issue in terms of binary oppositions, i.e., positioning secularists on one side and Islamists on the other, as there are hybrid behaviors composed of both positions, not to mention the specificity of Turks, many of whom have adapted to modernity.
These behaviors were present in the awareness of the leaders of the "Justice and Development Party" (AKP), who were part of it at certain stages, and as they learned its lessons and absorbed the conditions for success and continuity in the political arena, they made sure to present a reconciliatory formula between Islam, secularism, and democracy that succeeded in attracting a significant sector of the elite and a large portion of the masses, who gave them their votes and trust in elections.
When they considered themselves a conservative and democratic party, that directly implied their commitment to respecting the core values in Turkish society, primarily religion and secularism. By doing this, they revived the neglected cornerstone of Turkish political identity, which is Islam, which was dissolved by Kemalist secularism in its dominant project. Within the limits of the available framework, their invocation of Islam occurred in the social context rather than the political sphere, thus presenting the reform project over the ideological one, which explains their minimization of the significance of the hijab battle provoked by extreme secularists and their preoccupation with
confronting the economic crisis, enhancing freedoms, and seeking to join the European Union.
Erdogan, the leader of the "Justice and Development Party," stated in February 2000 while he was still a member of the "Virtue Party," as follows: "It is a mistake to equate the party with religion and religion with politics. We do not aim to establish an Islamic state, nor are we a theocratic party. If pious people engage in political life without considering religious standards as a reference for themselves, we cannot talk about political Islam."
The "Justice and Development Party" succeeded in convincing the vast majority of the conservative Islamic community of its viewpoint and managed to rally support from its most dynamic elements. Economically, it focused on concepts of "free competition," "rationality," "sense of responsibility," and "transparency in economic policy" followed by the modern state. It called for an open society, closely linked to the activities of non-governmental organizations that would limit the state’s urge to control all aspects of economic, cultural, and social life. This societal concept, which aims to prevent the overwhelming presence of the state in an almost neoliberal manner, does not endorse the idea of an Islamic state eager to shape all areas of life according to its own ideology; however, the concept does allow for the emergence of an Islamic society ready to reconsider the strict restrictions on religious activity, particularly in terms of education and freedom of organization.
When these contemporary reformers resigned from the "Virtue Party" in 2001, their response to the question: What is new in your contemporary renewal movement? was:
1. Our new movement will not revolve around feelings and religious beliefs but rather on democratic foundations, transparency, dialogue, and cooperation.
2. Our movement will not operate according to the method of political work based on blind obedience to the leader or president, as was the case in Erbakan’s era, but rather according to a collective work approach or team work in politics, administration, and governance.
3. Our movement will not be preoccupied with resolving superstructure problems but will focus on addressing the issues that concern the substructure, namely the Turkish people suffering from unemployment, inequality in wealth distribution, growth, and social justice.
4. We are not advocates of political wrangling, nor are we fond of empty political conflicts and quixotic battles; rather, our new movement calls for social reconciliation, dialogue, and cooperation, because there are many common points between us and others.
5. Our movement will not pose a danger or a threat to the existing system, as we will not follow policies that constitute such a threat.
6. We will meet citizens' desires to join the European Union and will prepare appropriate conditions for such membership as part of our national interest.
7. The issue of the hijab will not be a cause for wrangling and conflict in our party's upcoming programs, as we will address such issues within the framework of human rights that we advocate for protecting, especially since the hijab does not represent the fundamental problem for Turkish women, who need solutions to their economic and social issues, participation in political life, and enjoyment
Dr. Abdullah Turkmani
