The situation in Iran and the Middle East is highly sensitive and on the verge of explosion, with last year’s transformations revealing significant changes in this part of the world. For over 40 years, we have claimed that the Iranian regime’s survival strategy is based on internal repression, exporting extremism and terrorism, and inciting wars. From the very beginning, the strategic bet of the regime has relied on these two elements. Domestically, the regime has depended on repression, while externally, it has focused on igniting wars and exporting its so-called revolution. The mass executions in the early 1980s, the massacre of thirty thousand political prisoners in the summer of 1988, the brutal torture in Iranian prisons, and finally, the bloody suppression of popular uprisings in 2017, 2019, and 2022—these are undeniable facts of absolute repression within the country.

Externally, since Khomeini came to power, we have witnessed direct intervention in Iraq, alongside Khomeini and other leaders' calls for the Iraqi people to rebel against their government, which led to the outbreak of war. After the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iran, the regime continued the war until 1988 under the slogan "Liberating Jerusalem through Karbala." Subsequently, it established Hezbollah and began a policy of hostage-taking. After the war, the Quds Force was founded to start forming its proxies in the region. The regime's pursuit of a nuclear bomb is part of this strategy, not only as a deterrent against foreign states but also to ensure the continuity of its interventionist policies in the region.

The significant shift at this stage is that the regime has reached its limits concerning internal repression and regional intervention, leading to the emergence of a counter-trend. A notable characteristic of this period is that the regime has hit a dead end in both areas; repression and regional intervention are no longer as beneficial to it as they once were.

Internally, during the 2022 uprising, colonial forces, their allies, and dissident elements of the regime attempted to prevent the movement from radicalizing sufficiently to overthrow the regime. Their central slogan became "Women, Life, Freedom," instead of "Women, Resistance, Freedom," aiming to avoid radicalizing the movement and shaping change within their interests.

However, the harsh reality is that these movements have not and will not overthrow the regime. The Iranian resistance has affirmed the slogan "Death to the oppressor, whether the Shah or the Leader," which is the most significant political distinction in this context. Beyond these issues, the participation of youth in the uprising marked a significant transformation in society, driven by two factors: first, the Iranian regime's deadlock; and second, the role of forty years of resistance that has established a culture of opposition at the heart of Iranian society.

Socially, this was a monumental shift. In this regard, the 2022 uprising was an expression of social transformation. Coupled with the deadlock facing the regime in the economic realm and the poverty and thousands of living problems endured by the majority of Iranian society, it is clear that the regime is at its weakest point in 45 years. Especially after the uprising, tightening the regime's grip did not help, nor did the advent of certain figures like Pezeshkian. On the contrary, the regime's situation worsened.

For this reason, the regime, led by Khamenei, is trying with all its might to prevent another uprising, knowing that the next uprising will be more radical and widespread while the regime is at its weakest. Khamenei initiated war in the region to prevent another uprising, and this was not from a position of strength. Regardless of intervention mechanisms, it is evident that had the regime lacked the will and desire, the attack on October 7 would not have taken place. Assessments over the past year indicate that the regime has made a significant miscalculation, leading to wrong decisions during this period. Historically, when tyrants reach their final stages, they commit mistakes that observers may not initially comprehend, perceiving the dictator’s movements as signs of strength, when the reality is otherwise.

The regime's initial assessment was that this attack would deal a decisive blow and would face a limited reaction from the other side, believing that an agreement would be reached after two months, and that following this blow, it would attain a higher status in the region, gain greater concessions from the West to compensate for the defeat it encountered in the 2022 uprising, prevent another uprising, and exploit appeasement politics to obtain concessions for solving some of its internal problems.

Thus, what is currently happening, which we consider an unprecedented situation over the past 45 years, is the reality that both foundational pillars of the regime's survival—internal repression and the policy of war—have sustained substantial blows, rendering the regime more fragile than ever.

**Lavant: Farid Mahouchi**